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ABSTRACT

Although all flight tests possess their own inherent risks, safe store separation
tests, especially those targeting release conditions at or near maximum sanctioned
clearance limits, add more hazards to an already bloated list of obstacles. Since the
success of most modern flight test programs is measured in terms of cost, schedule, and
performance, an unsuccessful test flight can add tens of thousands of dollars and months
to an already beleaguered program. With ever-increasing flight hour costs and dwindling
budgets, reducing or eliminating unnecessary or unsuccessful sorties is essential. The
trick, then, is to fly to achieve desired test conditions, yet not exceed aircraft limitations
and cause the tester to return to base prematurely or, worse, not return at all.
With the requirement to test near the aircraft airspeed limits, occasional clearance
limit violations are expected. However, during the weapons separation Follow on Test
and Evaluation (FOT&E) phase of the F/A-18 E and F model Super Hornet, of the 55
attempts at test endpoint conditions targeting 600 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS), 1.20
indicated Mach number (IMN), and 0.5 g normal acceleration, 11 resulted in airspeed
limit exceedances. These failures accounted for 20% of the total number of attempts.
Aircraft clearance limits are imposed by many engineering disciplines. Thorough
knowledge of these aircraft limits and their genesis is vital for effective risk assessment,
decision making, and avoidance.
This thesis examines modern weapons separation test techniques for the F/A-18
E/F Super Hornet, the obstacles faced with regard to testing near airspeed limits, the
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planning and flight techniques required to overcome them, results, and lessons learned for
test planners and pilots alike.
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PREFACE
Most information contained within this thesis was obtained during actual Naval
flight test of Weapon System Integration test projects at the Naval Air Warfare CenterAircraft Division (NAWC-AD) located in Patuxent River, Maryland. The analysis,
opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed herein are those of the author and
do not represent the official position of the Department of Defense (DOD), Department
of the Navy (DON), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), or Air Test and
Evaluation Squadron Twenty Three (AIRTEVRON23). Although information was
obtained from actual flight test, dedicated flights to support this thesis were not
performed.
The author was the project officer for many of the weapons separation test
projects mentioned herein. Although the test methods and techniques discussed in this
thesis were developed specifically for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, they may be applied
similarly to most any high performance tactical aircraft.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

SAFE SEPARATION FLIGHT TEST
During World War II, most air-to-ground munitions came in the form of free-fall
bombs or ballistic rounds launched from some internal aircraft mechanism such as a
bomb bay or gun. Although some aircraft did carry weapons externally, due to propellerdriven aircraft performance limitations of the day, release of such ordnance usually
occurred at relatively low airspeeds and Mach numbers, limiting the impact of shock
wave effects and providing a relatively benign separation environment. During the rise of
jet propulsion after the war, however, aircraft performance capability increased
significantly. Although large, bomb bay-equipped aircraft still maintained their role as
strategic bombers, their smaller, more agile fighter-sized counterparts further evolved.
Departing from strictly air-to-air functions, separate new airframe designs sought to fill
the billet of tactical strike. These nimble new bomb-dropping specialists became known
as “attack” aircraft such as the A-4 Skyhawk, A-7 Corsair II, and A-6 Intruder. Both
fighter and attack aircraft refined their single-role doctrines to perfection. Defense
budgets are not bottomless, however, and through political and fiscal pressures these
distinct airframes ultimately re-merged into the multi-role “strike-fighters” of today such
as the F/A-18 Hornet (figure 1).
For over 50 years, wing and fuselage-mounted bombs have been the staple of
attack aircraft munitions. The increase in aircraft performance after World War II bred a
natural desire for expanded weapon release envelopes. As airspeed and Mach number
1

Figure 1
F/A-18A HORNET PERFORMING SAFE SEPARATION TESTING
Photo courtesy Vernon Pugh
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capabilities grew, however, so did the complexity of predicting weapon separation
characteristics. Free-fall weapons that were previously exposed to comparatively benign
subsonic flows and dominated by gravitational forces now faced supersonic shockwaves,
high dynamic pressures and suction effects to a degree never before experienced. Bombs
released in this environment exposed the aircraft to significant dangers as unstable bomb
flight caused unpredictable weapon flight paths. Close to the aircraft, even a relatively
light, small unstable bomb impacting the airframe could cause severe structural damage
or catastrophic failure. Also, bomb-to-bomb collisions, even hundreds of feet away could
result in detonation and aircraft destruction. This further emphasized the need for
disciplined safe separation testing.

ENDPOINT OVERSPEEDS
Endpoints are defined as the final test points in a test plan matrix and encompass
the expected regions of worst case store separation characteristics, but not to exceed
aircraft flight limitations. Except in rare cases, for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet these
conditions occur at 600 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS), 1.20 indicated Mach number
(IMN), and load factor of 0.5 (and thus 60 deg dive). During the weapons separation
segment of the Follow on Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) phase for the F/A-18 E/F Super
Hornet (as of December 2002), 55 attempts were made at endpoint conditions for the
release of various stores. Of these attempts, 11 resulted in exceeding the air-to-ground
store speed limit of 635 KCAS, and comprised a full 20% of the total attempts.1 These
overspeeds, like most clearance limit violations, resulted in mandatory discontinuation of
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the sortie and immediate return to base for maintenance inspection. An effort to
determine causal factors and avoid future excursions was therefore launched.

TESTING CONSIDERATIONS
The total number of required test flights and the allowable amount of leap
between test points depend on desired final clearance limits, results from previous
separation tests on similar stores, the type and number of different aircraft to be cleared,
and type of delivery profiles and minimum release intervals that are desired. Overall,
release envelopes should be extended as large as possible to allow for development of
new fleet tactics and introduction of new delivery maneuvers. In all cases, the separation
characteristics should be tested beyond the limits recommended in a final clearance to
allow a safe margin of error for the end user. Additionally, the carriage of stores should at
least be cleared to the airspeed, Mach number, and load factor limits of the basic airplane
(LBA). For the F/A-18 E/F (a further description of which is located in appendix A), the
air-to-ground stores carriage limits are 635 KCAS and 1.3 IMN.
Table 1 further describes the airspeed and Mach number specifications for the F/A-18
E/F.2 Although optimally the release regime should also posses the same capabilities, its
maximum release load factor (much more commonly known as “g”) should be at least 4.0
and its minimum at most 0.5. Moreover, releases should be demonstrated up to a 60
degree dive and down to their minimum release interval (MRI).3,4 According to the F/A18 E/F specification, all store ejections must be accomplished between a minimum load
factor of zero and a maximum from table 2. 2
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Table 1
F/A-18 E/F STORE DESIGN SPEED SPECIFICATION
Source: Detailed Specification for Model F/A-18 E/F Aircraft Weapons Systems
Wing Station Airspeed and Mach Number
Limits (KCAS/IMN)
Store
OutInboard
Midboard
board
Air-to-Air
Missiles

Goal
Required

AIM-7 & 9
AIM-120

LBA
(720)
635/1.6
635/1.6

LBA
(720)
610/1.6
560/1.6

LBA
(720)
575/1.6
560/1.6

Air-to635/1.3
550/1.3
550/1.3
Ground
Required
Missiles
Tank
Air-to- AIM 7&9 575/1.6 575/1.6
Air
AIM120
560/1.6 560/1.6
Inboard,
635/1.6
Required
Tank &
Air-to550/1.3
550/1.3
Gnd
Weapons
635/1.3
635/1.3
635/1.3
Air-toGoal
Ground
575/1.3
575/1.3
550/1.3
Required
Stores*
* This requirement applies to both similar and dissimilar stores on adjacent stations.
Note: For configurations involving AGM-88 HARM on the outboard station, the required
speed may be 540/1.3

Table 2
F/A-18E/F MAXIMUM RELEASE LOAD FACTOR SPECIFICATION
Source: Detailed Specification for Model F/A-18 E/F Aircraft Weapons Systems
Load Factor Specification
Single Release
Store Type
Centerline
Midboard or Multiple
Release
or Inboard
Outboard
Stations
Stations
Air-toAir
6.0
Rail Launched
5.0
6.0
6.0
0-620 lbs
Air-to-Ground
Ejector
3.0*
620-1120 lbs
5.0
Released
1120-2100 lbs
4.0
*Limits shall be based on flight test results, but not less than a load factor of 3.0 at
aircraft delivery weight, which includes 60% internal fuel
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

TEST PLANNING
Safe separation testing for tactical military aircraft generally includes release of a
wing or fuselage mounted store (tank, pod, weapon, etc.) and associated data analysis in
the form of onboard film or video, photogrammetric data reduction, six-degree of
freedom (6-DoF) telemetry, or ground camera footage. Depending on the amount of
engineering analysis available, three primary test methodologies exist for the weapon
separation engineer: “brute force” flight test build up, endpoint demonstration, and model
verification.3,4
The “brute force” build up approach consists only of actual incremental flight test
and is considered the most reliable way to definitively prove separation characteristics. It
allows direct trend observation of the separating store and results in an ability to provide
immediate, although partial, capability to the fleet. Since this method does not rely on
analytical predictions or previous separation results, however, it suffers from a high
degree of outcome uncertainty and risk. Alleviating these drawbacks requires incremental
buildup in small steps which directly leads to an increase in total number of sorties and
store assets required. This makes it the most costly in price and man-hours and thus least
desirable from a programmatic standpoint.
The method of Endpoint Demonstration is reserved for test stores that can be
considered analogous to other stores previously displaying safe separation characteristics.
However, despite its name, this method still requires initial separations to be conducted at
6

benign, preferably repeatable, flight conditions to first verify similarity to the comparison
store before proceeding to the critical end point flight conditions. Fortunately, it allows
for comparatively quick, inexpensive completion of the test effort since a minimum
number of sorties and store assets are required. Testers must proceed cautiously when
using this approach, however, since seemingly small inconsequential differences in store
or aircraft configuration may, in fact, cause large variations in separation characteristics.
This technique, therefore, suffers from a degree of uncertainty since every possible
condition in the envelope of a store will not be tested, and unknown performance pitfalls
may escape undiscovered.
The Model Verification method is employed by generating an analytical model
from wind tunnel data or computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis then validating it
through actual flight test. Considered low risk from a flight safety standpoint, this
approach also reduces program uncertainty by delivering performance expectations up
front. A large expenditure of funds is usually necessary early in a program to collect and
process the data. However, if the model is deemed accurate, the expense can be
compensated in the long run by fewer total sorties. Additionally, requiring analysis
completion before actual flight test can occur may result in significant schedule delays if
not properly managed. By comparing flight test data with analytical predictions and
determining their trends, testers are able to focus flight test efforts on regions of interest
within the envelope.
In a perfect world, all three techniques would be fully used in an effort to
combine and overlap data. However, the reality of tight budgets and compressed
schedules make such a meticulous exploration unrealistic. Fortunately, proper foresight,
7

planning and safety consciousness usually allow a partial combination of the three
techniques to be used. However, despite great leaps in wind tunnel data gathering
techniques and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer technology, the only sure
way to positively determine separation characteristics of a store is to actually release and
observe it.
SEPARATION HAZARDS
Barring the unexpected material failure, all separation hazards are historically
caused by the same factors, although the results are often quite different. Poor separation
performance can be attributed to three major conditions: high airspeed, low normal
acceleration, and close release interval.3 Aerodynamic forces can far exceed ejection and
gravity forces at high release airspeeds. These problems are exacerbated at supersonic
speeds where shock wave effects can cause stores to pitch or yaw back into the aircraft.
Additionally, releases in steep dives with their accompanying low normal load factor
provide little separation force to move stores away from aircraft. These phenomena
cause the most dangerous store separation hazards to both the tester and ground personnel
which are store-to-aircraft collisions, store-to-store collisions, and store instability.
Anything striking an airframe has the obvious potential to damage it. Even small,
relatively light weapons can impart a great deal of energy especially when released at the
aforementioned high speeds. Despite being heavy, a large and massive store does not
necessarily fall away from the separation aircraft any more cleanly nor exhibit any less
motion than a lighter counterpart. In fact, they can be surprisingly agile. Given the fact
that most ordnance is carried under an aircraft’s wing, the weapon’s proximity to vital
control surfaces further increases the risk of catastrophic damage. An unexpected bomb8

Figure 2
RACK AND BOMB STRIKING A-4 CHASE AIRCRAFT
Source: F/A-18 Project Office
to-aircraft collision with an ordinarily benign 1000 lb general purpose bomb and rack can
be deadly to the tester or chase as shown in figure 2. Fortunately the aircrew safely
ejected in this case.
Store-to-store collisions below a releasing aircraft may not seem as dangerous as
striking an aircraft outright. However, they not only possess the potential to pitch up
towards the releasing aircraft and hit it, but, if live weapons, an impact can cause
premature detonation as well. The results of an exploding live bomb mere feet below are
almost guaranteed to be catastrophic. Additionally, collisions can cause bombs to bounce
apart, reducing overall accuracy when attacking a target or falling completely outside
expected bomb dispersion patterns.
Store instability can cause the weapon to tumble and most likely fall short of an
intended target. It has the distinct possibility of falling outside a test hazard pattern or, if
employed operationally, destroying an unintended target. Weapons with simply weak
stability are little better and may cause a “coning” effect where the bomb spins,
circumscribing a spiraling cone, greatly reducing accuracy.
9

Table 3
TYPICAL WEAPONS SEPARATION FLIGHT COST
Source: F/A-18 Project Office
Item
Cost (U.S. Dollars)
F/A-18E Flight Cost (1.5 hours)
$16,200
Test Item Preparation (6 bombs)
$5,400
Range/Airspace (1 hour)
$9,400
Telemetry (1.5 hours)
$7,500
Onboard Camera Support
$6,800
Photogrammetric Processing
$8,000
Data Reduction
$2,300
Total:
$55,600

FLIGHT TEST COST
Possession of a test asset is not enough to execute a successful test. Rather, the
project teams must share the responsibilities of feeding and maintaining them as well.
Table 3 shows the approximate cost breakdown for a typical 1½ hour weapon separation
test flight on an F/A-18E. These costs account for only the test itself, preparation, and
post flight data reduction, and do not include the man hours involved with test planning
or report writing.

TEST BUILDUP
For initial separation flights on untested stores, the first release conditions should
be as benign as possible. This leads to a single store released from a parent rack in
straight and level flight at a normal load factor of 1.0. Airspeed should be low to
minimize dynamic pressure and allow examination of the store’s basic dynamic behavior
during release. If possible, it should be at the airspeed corresponding to the aircraft’s
maximum range to minimize induced drag on the wing and reduce any local flow
angularities. These airspeeds provide another benefit since most aircraft store suspension
10

equipment is oriented to provide zero store angle of attack (AOA) at maximum range
airspeeds, thus further eliminating another source of perturbation.3
Level releases should then be performed at incrementally higher and lower
airspeeds until the maximum and minimum desired limits are reached. Overall separation
characteristics as determined by their variation in the aircraft’s flow field at different
speeds can now be determined. Once a straight and level investigation has been
completed, parameters such as mach, dive angle, normal acceleration, and release interval
may be incrementally expanded.
As dive angle is increased, the component of gravity perpendicular to the aircraft
datum line decreases and thus reduces the net separation force. Thus, aerodynamic forces
and stores dynamics begin to have a greater effect on separation characteristics (figure 3).
Optimally, the airspeed with the least aerodynamic influence, as determined from the
level release investigation, should be used for the first separation at each dive angle.

Figure 3
FORCES DURING SEPARATION FROM STRAIGHT PATH DIVES
Source: USNTPS FTM-109, Systems Testing
11

Then, releases at gradually increasing airspeed and Mach number should be performed
until maximum airspeed is reached. With satisfactory releases from level and shallow
dive high-speed situations, separations from steeper dives may be tested in increments of
up to 15 to 20 degrees.4 If results have been favorable thus far, usually only a few high
speed points need be completed in the dives before testing the maximum speed endpoint.
In cases where flight test separations are being used to verify an existing
analytical model, only certain key test points may be desired for comparison. In this case,
although the overall flight test is less rigorous due to a reduced number of sorties, it is
nevertheless still critical to approach each point in a build up manner until the model is
proven. Even then, unexpected singularities may still exist that were not uncovered by the
model. A sample test matrix is provided in appendix B.

RELEASE PARAMETERS
Certain aircraft parameters are critical for satisfactory post flight data analysis and
are listed in table 4. The most vital information is airspeed, Mach number, and normal
acceleration (nz), all normally obtained from either on-board instrumentation or pilot’s
flight instruments. Normally, free fall weapons are tested between a normal load factor of
0.5 and 1.0, whereas forward-firing ordnance such as missiles may be tested from 0.5 g
up to 6.0 and above.4 Due to the near-impossible nature of achieving exact parameters
simultaneously, nominal tolerances are provided in table 4 as well.
Interestingly, during separation testing, the altitude, although critical for data
analysis, is considered non-critical to the test pilot (other than for terrain avoidance) and
allowed to “fall out” of his test conditions scan. Since on a standard day 600 KCAS and
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Table 4
CRITICAL AIRCRAFT PARAMETERS
Parameter
Units
Typical Test Tolerances
Altitude
Feet
±1000
Calibrated Airspeed
KCAS
±10
Indicated Mach Number
IMN
±0.02
Normal Acceleration (nz)
g
+0.1 / -0.2
Dive Angle
Degrees
±5
1.20 IMN roughly intersect at 18,000 ft MSL, which provides adequate altitude for a safe
dive recovery maneuver, the test team will usually accept whatever release altitude is
achieved based on environmental conditions.

RELEASE MANEUVERS
A maneuver, of some type, must be used to achieve target parameters. The most
common procedure used in safe separation testing today is the straight path dive. Usually
achieved from a roll-in maneuver where the test aircraft is rolled to inverted, pulled down
to desired dive angle, then rolled upright again, this type of dive makes attainment of
release parameters both rapid and repeatable.

STRAIGHT PATH DIVES
Proper planning of test conditions is critical since dive maneuvers are not just
used to help accelerate the aircraft to test airspeeds. Test points demanding steady load
factors of one and below (normally experienced when employing freefall weapons
operationally) require a straight path dive angle. To determine what dive angle is
appropriate for desired conditions, one must calculate the arccosine of the target load
factor. For example, a test load factor of 1.0 is best attained from straight and level flight
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(zero degree dive angle) while 0.7 is achieved from approximately a 45 deg dive and 0.5
from a 60 degree dive. To ensure repeatability and comparability with an analytical
model, the tester must minimize variations in gravity vector position. Thus dive angles
are normally restricted to within a tolerance of ±5 degrees.
At straight and level conditions where poor aircraft performance capabilities
prevent attainment of target parameters, especially low altitude, high transonic Mach
number points, shallow dives angles (normally up to 30 degrees) may be used to
accelerate into the test point. Although a steady shallow dive as much as 35 degrees
would still result in a load factor within normal test point tolerances of +0.1 and -0.2 for a
1.0 load factor test point, (i.e. load factor is 0.8 in a 35 degree dive) it would exceed
normal dive angle tolerances of ±5 degrees and would shift the direction of the weight
vector and is therefore unacceptable. Once conditions are attained, therefore, the aircraft
must be recovered to near-level flight for release. This greatly increases pilot workload,
however, and often results in failure to achieve test conditions since most excess Mach
number and airspeed built up in the shallow dive is counteracted by the bleed rate
necessary to recover to near straight and level flight.

CURVILINEAR DIVES
Although desired load factors can theoretically be attained from most any attitude
by applying a sustained forward push on the control stick and commanding the aircraft to
fly a constant target load factor, it is not authorized for free-fall ordnance testing. This
technique, known as a curvilinear dive, reduces the gravity component of the separation
force to below that which is experienced in a straight path dive delivery of comparable
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dive angle. Essentially “flying into the bomb”, this method decreases the resultant
separation force and thus the safety margin of separation. In fact, the F/A-18 E/F Tactical
Manual states “avoid pushovers during weapon release to prevent aircraft to bomb or
bomb-to-bomb collisions”.5 If a constant pushover is applied, a pitch rate, however
minor, ensues. Depending on where test conditions are approached in the dive and when
the pushover is initiated, the actual store release may occur at an unpredictable dive
angle, not only altering gravity vector placement, but making it difficult to repeat the test
point for later comparison. Additionally, this technique increases the pilot’s workload as
there are fewer steady state parameters; he must not only monitor and anticipate target
test conditions, but must also more closely monitor normal acceleration and constantly
modulate stick inputs to maintain it. Although still higher workload, this method usually
has less safety impact on separation tests involving forward-firing rail-launched missiles,
since they eject forward and away from the aircraft and do not linger beneath.

PILOT RELEASE TECHNIQUE
Since aircraft conditions are usually changing very rapidly, especially when
performing endpoint separation testing from a 60 degree dive, the first priority is to
stabilize as many parameters as possible and eliminate them from the test pilot’s visual
scan. The first likely candidates are heading and dive angle (and its accompanying load
factor), which can be attained as soon as the aircraft has finished its roll-in maneuver.
Maintenance of the target dive angle (and thus load factor) is facilitated by applying
slight nose down longitudinal trim so that little to no control stick input is required. Next,
by modulating throttle setting, Mach number should be captured so that attention may
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then be diverted to monitoring airspeed buildup and anticipating desired release
conditions. Given the transient nature of airspeed as the aircraft is accelerating,
descending, and maintaining constant mach, release conditions will be realized for only a
fleeting moment. Once attained (within a nominal tolerance), the test pilot must then
command release of the test store. The method of ensuring complete and unperturbed
separation is often referred to as a “pickle, pause, pull” technique whereby the test pilot
depresses the weapon release button, holds it down for the duration of store release
(usually fractions of a second), then begins a dive recovery.

DIVE RECOVERY
After weapons release (or simulated release in case of a practice profile), the test
aircraft must arrest its rate of descent and return to level or climbing flight. This is
accomplished by the dive recovery maneuver which consists simply of a wings level
pullup to the horizon or above.

SOURCES OF FLIGHT CLEARANCE LIMITS
Various aircraft clearance limits are imposed by many engineering disciplines
such as flutter, loads, structures, flying qualities, and propulsion. Understanding the
genesis of these limits helps both the test planner and test pilot make informed decisions
when assessing a project’s physical risk. For the F/A-18 E/F, like many aircraft,
aeroelastic concerns, specifically flutter, dominate the overspeed hazard assessment.
Loads and structural considerations, usually confined to very specific aircraft store
configurations, take a distant second place.
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AEROELASTIC EFFECTS
Flutter prediction is often considered a “black art” and is still in its infancy. Many
techniques exist for flutter flight testing, data gathering, and information interpretation,
but none is an exact science. During an aircraft’s design, flutter is never truly totally
eliminated, but rather its effects are moved to a part of the aircraft’s envelope that should
not be attainable in normal flight. Expertise on the flutter phenomenon and its effects
rests with only a few engineers. This lack of universal comprehension sometimes leads to
frustration and recklessness in the rest of the aviation and engineering communities.
Normally based upon structural and aerodynamic models, each segment of flutter
analysis utilizes several simplifying assumptions. These approximations naturally affect
the validity of any predictions, especially in transonic flight regimes where transonic
models are poor. Since these analyses are, by themselves, insufficient to clear an area of
flight envelope, they are usually supported by wind-tunnel comparisons and ground
vibration tests. Nevertheless, flutter predictions should always be verified through
dedicated flight test using the same caution and build up as any other flight-test
evolution. 6

Flutter
Although only one of many aeroelastic effects, the “flutter mechanism” is made
up of a complex combination of forces and moments, structural dampings, and structural
stiffnesses. Basically, this interaction causes an oscillation in the form of rapid wing
twisting, or control surface or panel vibration. If two or more of these natural vibration
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modes coalesce, flutter may ensue. Overall system damping is comprised of both
structural damping, provided by such things as shape and construction material, and
aerodynamic damping generated by the air mass and “centering tendency” of the high
velocity air stream. Most structural modes will show an increase in frequency as airspeed
is increased due to aerodynamic “stiffening”. If left unchecked, these oscillations can
grow divergent and can progress until some structural failure occurs.
Flutter speed is considered the airspeed where damping is zero and an oscillation
barely possesses constant amplitude. Any minute energy addition in the form of an
airspeed increase or small load factor perturbation can cause the oscillation amplitude to
increase with time. Known as “divergent flutter”, this will eventually result in the
component exceeding its structural limits. Since this damage can be wreaked quickly,
almost instantaneously, within two or three cycles, flutter is extremely dangerous and
potentially deadly. Flutter susceptibility generally increases with airspeed and is further
irritated by thin flexible structures. Increases in torsional rigidity increase the flutter
speed, whereas modifications in bending rigidity provide little change.
Normal design practice requires an aircraft to be flutter-free beyond a speed 15%
above design limit flight speed (or 1.15 VL) 7, thus providing a margin of safety in the
event of exceeding an aircraft speed limit. Some loading configurations, especially those
developed after initial flutter analysis, will require a repeat of the flutter determination
procedure. If they do not meet the initial design criteria, they will usually require reduced
envelopes to ensure safe flight outside flutter-prone areas, rather than redesign of the
aircraft.
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Limit Cycle Oscillation (LCO)
Another phenomenon driven by aeroelastic effects is limit cycle oscillation
(LCO). Although by strict definition it is not considered flutter and is certainly not nearly
as destructive, LCO is formed by similar components. It is a case where aerodynamic
damping exactly counteracts structural damping. This sustained sinusoidal structural
oscillation maintains constant amplitude with time, will generally only increase with
airspeed, and will continue indefinitely until a change in airspeed, altitude, or some other
disturbance triggers a change in aerodynamic damping. LCO has proven unpredictable
through analysis, although leading edge devices and increasing load factor or AOA have
all been linked with it. Although by itself a neutrally stable oscillation, it has shown both
resistance and susceptibility to occasional divergence. However, LCO usually only
promotes material fatigue, aircrew discomfort, or system degradation.6
LCO is most often seen during carriage of heavy underwing stores and is
sometimes known as heavy store oscillation (HSO). The F/A-18 A/B/C/D Hornet has
been known to experience LCO quite severely when carrying wingtip missiles and high
pitch inertia stores (such as 2000 lb bombs) on outboard wing stations, which is why it
utilizes a function known as active oscillation control (AOC) for certain store loadings at
low altitudes. This logic, which is incorporated directly into the flight control computer
system, uses the lateral accelerometers to sense and ailerons to damp an annoying 5 to 6
Hz wing oscillation.11
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External Store Effects
Overall aeroelastic stability of an aircraft is greatly influenced by the carriage of
external stores6,10. Each symmetric loading combination uniquely changes the mass
distribution and airflow around the wing, thus changing the tendency for the overall
structure to experience flutter, usually to a lower airspeed. Conversely, asymmetrical
loading of either stores or internal wing fuel tends to be stabilizing and increase flutter
speeds. The two most critical loadings for the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet occur with wing
tip missiles on and either a “clean” wing devoid of stores or one with outboard wing
station pylon-mounted AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM). Although
analyses show that the aircraft indeed has its required 15% airspeed cushion, the vertical
stabilizers and rudder have demonstrated the minimum analytical margin.8,9

LOADS LIMITS
During the design phase of an aircraft, the largest load that an aircraft component
is expected to encounter throughout all phases of flight is known as the “limit load”. To
provide an additional margin of safety, these limit loads are multiplied by safety factors
(usually 1.5) to determine the required “ultimate load” or the force that a component must
be capable of withstanding without actually breaking. Component limits are not restricted
merely to wing airloads from high load factor maneuvering, although lifting surfaces are
usually critical under those conditions.12 Rather, every component must withstand all
forces induced from every phase of flight. Components, which are manufactured to
ultimate load specifications, must later be tested to determine actual restrictions to be
imposed on aircraft and operator. After all, if a critical aircraft component breaks at high
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speed, the consequences could be just as deadly as a store-to-aircraft collision. Although
usually less likely to be approached or exceeded during safe separation testing, the F/A18 E/F Super Hornet’s loads limits are established based on either actual static ground
testing or through purely analytical strength calculations.
Static ground testing involves testing an actual component representative of a
production aircraft part and incrementally loading it until actual failure occurs, hopefully
occurring at least at the ultimate load value (again, which is usually 1.5 times the
anticipated limit load). Subsequently, the test aircraft would then be operationally
restricted to conditions which would generate two-thirds of the tested and proven failure
load. Analytical calculations, on the other hand, are performed when static failure load
data do not exist and mathematically determine under what load a component will likely
fail. The test aircraft is then operationally restricted to flight conditions which would
create 50% of that calculated load. Since it provides more fidelity, the static ground test is
always the more highly desired source for load limit determination. However, the cost of
manufacturing and testing parts to failure often prohibits this method. It is everyone’s
hope that these two test methods will result in established restrictions that are as good as
the original limit load assumptions, although realistically the analytical method is not
likely to do so. In the end, to provide yet more safety margin, the fleet operator is further
restricted to conditions that would generate 80% of the established test restrictions.
Interestingly, recent static ground tests on the wing of an F/A-18E/F showed that it did
not fail until 204% of the wing bending limit load. 13, 14
Dedicated in-flight loads testing has been performed on the Super Hornet using
load measuring strain gauges and accelerometers located strategically throughout the
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aircraft. These tests have revealed that, when carried, the components most susceptible to
a loads-induced failure during weapons separation testing is the 480 gallon external fuel
tank aft pivot and the wing store pylon aft attach points. These problems are exacerbated
especially when the fuel tanks are carried on the wing stations due to the often intense
underwing span-wise airflow. To further aggravate this condition, the primary separation
test aircraft (aircraft number E-10, side number 400) is only capable of carrying what are
known as “Rev A” pylons. These pre-production variants consist of weaker aft attach
points then their newer, stronger “Rev B” brethren. So, when carrying empty fuel tanks
on these pylons on the inboard stations, the maximum limit airspeed is reduced to 570
KCAS when adjacent to fuselage-mounted forward-looking infrared (FLIR) targeting
pods or 600 KCAS without. Fueling the tanks further restricts the maximum airspeed
below 550 KCAS.15
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CHAPTER 3
FACTORS AFFECTING SPEED CONTROL

While focusing on the 11 overspeed incidents, the 55 attempts at 600 KCAS, 1.20
IMN, and 0.5 load factor endpoints were analyzed to determine what common threads, if
any, could be established as contributing factors to airspeed control. A data summary is
presented in table C-1. The various components were broken down into two categories:
factors that directly and immediately affected maximum airspeed, and those factors that
were indirect contributors.

DIRECT CONTRIBUTORS
By plotting maximum airspeed against various dive and recovery parameters,
several contributors became apparent.

DIVE RECOVERY AIRSPEED
The airspeed at which recovery was initiated was perhaps the single biggest
contributor to overspeeds and was defined as the airspeed at which load factor began to
increase above the steady state dive load factor tolerance. The airspeed at which dive
recovery is initiated intuitively leads to peak airspeed control: the “earlier” that a dive
recovery is initiated, or, more precisely, the lower the airspeed that dive recovery is
commenced from, the more airspeed buffer that will be available before limit speed is
attained. Conversely, the “later” it is initiated, or the faster the aircraft is when recovery
is commenced, the closer the accelerating aircraft will be to the limit airspeed. As shown
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in figure C-1, in all overspeed cases the beginning of the dive recovery was not initiated
until 610 KCAS or later. Interestingly, the same figure also shows that several runs were
conducted quite successfully despite beginning dive recovery faster than 610 KCAS.
Therefore, other contributors must clearly exist. Regardless, overspeeds during endpoint
testing can be significantly reduced by prompt dive recovery immediately after weapon
release.

RECOVERY LOAD FACTOR
Peak load factor was defined as the highest commanded normal acceleration
experienced throughout the dive recovery. Short duration spikes in load factor or
responses due to transonic pitchup effects were not included. Generally speaking, the
higher the load factor, the higher the airspeed energy bleed rate. As shown in figure C-2,
over 70% of all overspeed cases occurred during dive recoveries of less than 4.5 peak
load factor. As a result, although once again not fully conclusive, higher load factors
from harder pullouts, targeting at least 4.5 during recovery will significantly lower the
probability of overspeed occurrence. This observation also necessitates a suitable
minimum available load factor capability for the aircraft so that after avoiding the
overspeed, these elevated load factors do not drive the aircraft into an overstress
situation. Aircraft gross weight and any flight clearance load factor limits imposed
(which are often artificially low) will ultimately determine the final load factor available
(or “g-available”). For the F/A-18 E/F, this is known as “nzW” and is determined by
calculating the ratio of 42,097 lbs (the “basic flight design gross weight” or BFDGW)
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and actual gross weight then multiplying it by the flight clearance load factor, which is
ordinarily 7.5, barring any non-standard and weaker aircraft components.

RECOVERY LOAD FACTOR ONSET RATE
Load factor onset rate (better known as “g-onset”) was defined as the rate of load
factor build up from the time of dive recovery initiation to the time of reaching peak
steady load factor. The data from figure C-3 shows that almost two-thirds of overspeeds
(64%) occurred from dive recoveries using load factor onset rates of less than 2/s.
Therefore not only is a high peak load factor pullout helpful, but it must be accomplished
in a timely manner so that it is hopefully reached before the peak airspeed is realized.
Nevertheless, a high load factor onset parameter is also unfortunately not a cure-all and
must be used in conjunction with other mitigation techniques.

THROTTLE SETTING
Engine thrust is really the only instantaneous control the pilot has on acceleration
in the aircraft’s x-axis. Many high drag store configurations targeting 60 degree dive
endpoints require maximum afterburner (MAX) to just barely achieve test conditions.
Unfortunately it is impossible to sufficiently quantify thrust output, for although the
throttle’s angular position is measured, telemetered, and recorded throughout a typical
weapon separation flight, the total thrust is not. Throttle position, however, can be a
valuable tool to compare relative power settings. Figures C-4 and C-5 each compare the
throttle settings from two weapon separation runs on one sortie, each coincidentally
containing a successful non-overspeed and an unsuccessful overspeed case. Maximum
afterburner on the plot is about 45 deg throttle angle, while full military power (MIL) is
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reached about 35 deg and flight idle around 7 deg. Recovery was initiated at time zero.
From the figures, the non-overspeed cases show a significant throttle reduction compared
to their overspeed counterparts. Figure C-4 illustrates the importance of power reduction
at recovery. On the live run of flight #455, power was reduced to mid-range almost ¾ of
a second after recovery was initiated and did not result in an overspeed. Table C-1, on the
other hand, shows that the practice run on flight #455 initiated recovery a full 6 knots
(kts) sooner than the live run yet resulted in a peak airspeed 9 kts faster. In fact, of all
overspeed runs, the practice run of flight #455 started recovery at the lowest airspeed
(610 KCAS) and used the highest peak load factor (5.9), yet still oversped. The sustained
excessive power setting of the suspect practice run in Figure C-4 explains why.
Figure C-5 tells a similar story. Specifically, it shows that both runs of flight #457
approached the recovery point near maximum afterburner, but that in the practice run, the
throttles were retarded about 0.5 sec sooner and almost to idle. In the live run, on the
other hand, throttle reduction was delayed and only reduced to mid-range power.
Moreover, table C-1 shows that the live run of flight #457 initiated recovery 2 kts sooner,
and pulled out with a 0.8/s greater onset rate to 0.5 higher peak load factor, yet still
oversped. This punctuates the impact that power setting has on speed control.
Thus, timely reduction in power setting, especially to idle power, assists greatly in
overspeed avoidance, especially when coupled with the recovery timing and techniques
above.
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INDIRECT CONTRIBUTORS

CONFIGURATION
Aircraft load out and subsequent drag has a major impact on overall aircraft
performance. Unfortunately there is little that can be done to quantify the “dragginess” of
an aircraft. Although the “drag index” calculation available in the aircraft operator’s
manual15 is useful for determining specific performance characteristics such as range,
fuel consumption, and optimum airspeeds, this only applies to cruise phases of flight. It
cannot be used to accurately predict performance under the conditions of a typical
separation flight such as steep dives from 40,000 ft at maximum afterburner. It can,
however, be invaluable in providing a relative drag value for qualitative purposes so that
a pilot may make comparisons to other previously flown loading configurations.
Basically, the more ordnance on the aircraft, the more drag and the longer it will take to
attain test conditions, but the faster the aircraft will decelerate during recovery. However,
the flights listed in table C-1 had widely varying drag indices from over 250 down to 50
and showed no correlation with overspeed tendency.

DIVE ANGLE
The method chosen to achieve target release conditions depends on the
performance capabilities of the aircraft and the conditions themselves. Of all the indirect
overspeed components, dive angle plays the biggest part. For tests requiring steady state
load factors below 1.0, dives are required- and the lower the target load factor, the steeper
the dive. Naturally, the steeper the dive, the more likely the aircraft is to accelerate since
the weight vector will be more in line with that of the desired thrust vector. Beware,
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however, because steep dive angles are a double-edged sword since not only do they
promote acceleration to achieve test points quickly, but they also hinder deceleration after
release. Endpoint release tests using dive angles shallower than approximately 45 deg are
manageable, for although test conditions are often challenging to achieve from an aircraft
performance standpoint, the aircraft can easily be recovered after release without
breaking airspeed limits. In fact, during the same FOT&E period, no reports of weapon
separation related overspeeds were reported from 45 degree dives.1
Unfortunately, test points are not only defined merely by airspeed and mach, but
by normal acceleration as well. When attempting steady 0.5 load factor points, a 60
degree dive is required. A devoted airspeed scan is more critical at these higher dive
angles. When pursuing a 600 KCAS, 1.20 IMN, 0.5 load factor test point from a typical
60 degree dive, airspeed build up rate when nearing release conditions is typically over
15 kts per second. Given a normal F/A-18 air-to-ground store carriage limit of 635
KCAS, any hesitation or fixation in pilot attention can lead to aircraft overspeed in
around two seconds.
Shallower dives would naturally be desired to produce a manageable acceleration.
However, as established earlier, alternate techniques of setting shallow steady dive
angles, then pushing over to a achieve target load factor are not acceptable for free fall
ordnance, despite establishing desired normal accelerations. Fortunately, for most
forward-firing, rail-launched ordnance this restriction does not necessarily apply. The
shallower dive and slower acceleration can be partially offset by using a pushover
technique to establish dive angle and is explained later. One major disadvantage of the
shallower dive method is that it often does not produce desired steady state load factors.
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This must be compensated for by using the previously forbidden pushover-to-release
method, thereby increasing the pilot’s workload and risk of out-of-tolerance missile
separations.

DIVE TECHNIQUES
The method used to get to the final dive angle is as important as the dive angle
itself. Roll-in maneuvers consist of performing an unloaded aileron roll to inverted,
pulling down to the desired dive angle, then performing an unloaded roll back to upright.
Since the aircraft must bear a positive load factor during most of the maneuver, especially
the pull down, it suffers from increased induced drag which tends to cause the aircraft to
bleed precious airspeed.
Another method to establish the aircraft in a dive is to push over, rather than pull
down. By eliminating the roll to inverted and instead applying forward stick and
unloading the aircraft to somewhere between a load factor of 0.2 and 0.5 (the F/A-18 E/F
is limited to a 2-second transient duration between -0.2 and 0.2 load factor)15, a gentle
pitch rate ensues while the aircraft accelerates. By unloading the aircraft, the angle of
attack and weight that the wings must counteract are diminished. This creates a reduction
in induced drag and thus lower total drag, allowing the aircraft to accelerate faster than if
it had been loaded at 1.0 nz or above.
Figure C-6 compares both these techniques performed in maximum afterburner
while targeting the same release conditions of 600 KCAS, 1.20 IMN, and 0.5 nz. In the
roll-in method, by the time the aircraft reaches its target dive angle (60 degrees in this
case), it has gained barely 10 kts. In fact, it does not really begin appreciably accelerating
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until the jet is unloaded and rolled upright again. In the pushover-to-dive technique,
however, the aircraft is accelerating throughout the entire maneuver- by the time it has
reached its maximum dive angle (which in this case is 30 degrees- half that of the roll-in
example), it has gained over 100 kts.
There are many other factors to weigh, however. The roll-in maneuver attains its
maximum dive angle in almost half the time (figure C-7) than its pushover counterpart
and is useful for dealing with constrained airspace and focusing supersonic shockwaves
for noise abatement. Conversely, the entire pushover technique profile takes about 1 ½
times longer to fully complete (even when targeting half the dive angle)- valuable
seconds when burning upwards of over 400 lbs of fuel every minute in maximum
afterburner. Also, in this method, the aircraft translates forward the entire time as it
slowly increases dive angle and thus requires more distance to perform. Also, the
pushover-to-dive is usually reserved for shallower final dive angles which also tend to
extend the dive profile and produce higher steady state normal accelerations.
As established earlier, pushover-to-release techniques to attain release conditions
for free-fall ordnance are not authorized, however as suggested, they may sometimes be
used for forward-firing, rail-launched missiles.

FAN SPEED LOCKUP
The F/A-18 Hornet incorporates an engine “fan speed lockup” system that
prevents engine inlet shockwave instability (also known as “buzz”) at high Mach
numbers. Basically, when above 1.23 IMN and the throttles are retarded below MIL
power, the system holds engine speed and airflow at MIL power levels. Fan speed lockup
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is deactivated when the aircraft decelerates below 1.18 IMN. Thus, if attempting dive
recovery above 1.23 IMN the engines will be stuck at MIL power until decelerated below
1.18 IMN. While even in MIL power this deceleration would occur rapidly during a pull
out, it may not be possible while stuck at MIL in a steep dive. Nevertheless, a few
seconds of unintended excess power during dive recovery can contribute to an overspeed
situation.15, 17

SPEEDBRAKE
The speedbrake is a pilot-controlled drag-increasing device usually consisting of
dedicated extendable aerodynamic surfaces. On most tactical aircraft, such as the F/A-18
A through D Hornet, the speedbrake is mounted on the empennage area, operated by
hydraulic power, and controlled from the cockpit. The F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet,
however, is not fitted with independent speedbrake surfaces. Rather, a speedbrake
“function” is provided to increase drag by partial deflection of several of the aircraft’s
primary flight control surfaces including ailerons, rudders, trailing edge flaps, and
spoilers.
At subsonic speeds with gear up and flaps in AUTO mode (essentially UP), the
speedbrake function flares the rudders and symmetrically raises the ailerons trailing edge
up approximately 95% of their travel capability at the given flight conditions. This
ensures that about 5% of surface authority is available for yaw and roll control. If needed,
yaw and roll commands supercede speedbrake use of the ailerons and rudders. Trailing
edge flaps (TEFs) are also symmetrically lowered to further increase drag and to counter
the loss of lift caused by the deflecting ailerons. Spoilers which account for only about
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10% of the total speedbrake function capability, are later raised to their full 60 deg up
position only when the speedbrake command reaches 75% of extension. The stabilators
are commanded to counter pitch changes due to the deflection of all speedbrake surfaces
other than the spoilers. Delaying spoiler deflection until 75% of aileron, rudder, and TEF
function allows the pilot to use partial speedbrakes to assist in airspeed modulation, while
avoiding minor spoiler-induced pitch transients.
At supersonic speeds, speedbrake surface deflections are changed. The rudders
are not deflected above 1.05 IMN, due to vertical tail loads. Moreover, the ailerons and
TEFs are not deflected above 1.10 IMN due to a lack of effectiveness. The spoilers are
therefore deflected immediately upon speedbrake actuation, since they are the only
effective surface at these conditions. At supersonic speeds, the stabilator is programmed
to counter spoiler deployment transients. The speedbrake function is completely disabled
above 1.50 IMN.15
This capability is useful for making gross changes in airspeed throughout the dive
when power corrections are applied too late. Unfortunately, due to the changes in
underwing airflow, the speedbrake function must be fully deselected by the time release
is commanded. So, during typical 1.20 IMN endpoint test dive recoveries, the F/A-18 E/F
speedbrake function only applies spoilers and is virtually useless for preventing
overspeeds. After initiating dive recovery and power reduction, however, the aircraft will
eventually slow and allow full deployment of speed brake surfaces once below 1.05 IMN,
assisting dive recovery deceleration then.
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RELEASE DELAY
The method used for commanding store separation plays a major role in ensuring
a timely dive recovery, depending on the weapon. While the normal technique is the
“pickle-pause-pull” method, the duration of pause must account for all expected release
delays. These contributors to the release timeline duration are intrinsic system delay,
stick length (in the case of free-fall ordnance) or launch-to-eject (LTE) time (for
missiles), and pilot delay (figure 4).
System Delay
System delay consists of the time required for the release command from
actuation of the weapon release switch (known as the “pickle” switch) to be sent to the
mission computers, processed, transmitted to the stores management set (SMS), sent to
the station encoder/decoder, then sent to the impulse cartridges in the rack for detonation,
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release hook opening, and ejection foot extension. The system delay for the F/A-18 E/F is
approximately 20ms (or 0.02 seconds) and is considered negligible.
Stick Length
Although during separation testing most weapons are released in the “manual”
mode (MAN) and ejected immediately upon transmission of the weapon release
command, this often does not hold true for long strings of multiple bombs or missiles that
require an energizing period before launch. Cases where several bombs are released
singly in sequence introduce a discreet time interval between each separation, thus
extending the duration that the test aircraft must remain on conditions. Basically, the
more bombs and the larger the interval, the longer the aircraft must dwell in its dive and
the longer the weapon release button must be held. The duration of this “stick length” is
determined by adding the intervals of each successive bomb to drop after the first. For
example, a stick of four bombs released singly at 40ms intervals will add up to a 120ms
total stick length. So, assuming an instantaneous pilot reaction immediately after the last
bomb falls off the aircraft, test conditions must be maintained for merely 140ms.
However, due to poor separation characteristics or insufficient data, some weapons must
be released at much longer intervals to avoid bomb-to-bomb collisions. Although not
likely to be employed by the end user in the fleet in quantities more than one, some
weapons may require intervals as high as 300ms. In an effort to gather maximum data,
the test community must often drop several of these weapons in sequence at endpoint
conditions. This would drive a four-bomb stick length alone to over 600ms or 0.6 sec.
When accelerating at over 15 kts/s in a 60 degree dive, a test aircraft can gain over 9 kts
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in 0.6 sec. These rough calculations do not include system or pilot delay which can add
more seconds to the timeline and tens of knots to airspeed.
Launch-To-Eject (LTE) Time
Missiles possess inherent launch delays of their own and stem from requirements
to power up and download tracking data prior to launch. Known as “launch-to-eject”
(LTE) times, they can often be as much as 1.5 seconds. Again, when accelerating at 15
kts/s a timely missile launch is critical to a successful dive recovery. When attempting
endpoint conditions, it is important to understand the nature of these delays and options.
For example, safe separation testing is considered partial-task and usually does not
consider weapon performance post-release. Fortunately, many missiles have jettison
modes where the missile is commanded to power up and skip data transfer phase before
launch. This results in LTE times below 1.0 second and often instantaneous.
Pilot Delay
In addition to weapon LTE times, many “smart” weapons, when released in their
typical automatic modes, require the launch aircraft to satisfy certain launch envelope
parameters. The aircraft mission computers usually calculate weapon performance
capability based on current aircraft conditions. Often in the case of many guided
weapons, desired target coordinates must be specified in the mission computers as well.
Even if the weapon is physically disabled and incapable of steering to a designated target,
it must be delineated and within calculated range to satisfy automatic mode launch
criteria. This presents a unique problem for the test pilot since he must not only monitor
aircraft parameters for valid separation test purposes, but must also watch weapon
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envelope indications to ensure that they satisfy launch requirements. This distraction can
lead to fixation on parameters that, although vital for successful weapon launch, are
extraneous with regard to aircraft test conditions and safety.
The pure pilot delay time is difficult to quantify since it varies from person to
person. The average is assumed to be about one second; however, any pilot distraction
can extend this value. If, for example, the pilot waits for visual confirmation of missile
fly-out on a launch, he must visually scan and mentally process his outside environment.
This simple task can add seconds of delay during an already critical phase of flight, thus
leading to late dive recoveries at prohibitively high airspeeds.

AGM-88 HARM SEPARATION TEST OVERSPEED EXAMPLE
In November, 2002, an endpoint test flight was conducted on an F/A-18 E aircraft
(number E-10, side number 400) for the AGM-88 HARM. The target conditions were
typical 600 KCAS, 1.20 IMN, and 0.5 nz to be attained from a steady 60 degree dive. The
missile was to be launched in its “pre-briefed” (PB) mode whereby the aircraft mission
computer uses target coordinates set by the pilot to calculate range and determine, based
on aircraft conditions and weapon capability data, whether the aircraft is in position to
satisfy missile launch range criteria.
It was noticed throughout the first live run attempt that the aircraft was displaying
“in range” (IN RNG) indications but not “in zone” (IN ZONE), thus not meeting suitable
launch logic. However, fixation by the pilot on this information caused vital aircraft
parameters to drop out of his scan which resulted in a late dive recovery and subsequent
overspeed. However, since both the pilot and test engineers in the range control room
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were distracted by the unsuitable launch indications, neither noticed the airspeed limit
exceedance. After deliberating with the test engineers over the radio, the suspected
solution was to adjust target coordinates and move them closer to accommodate the
actual aircraft test location.
Believing that the launch problem was resolved, a second live run was conducted.
This time, indications at roll-in were favorable, switching from IN RNG to the desired IN
ZONE. But as the pilot’s scan switched from launch criteria to aircraft conditions, the
range indications switched back to IN RNG, unnoticed. Thus as release parameters were
attained, the pilot depressed the weapon release button and paused, anticipating LTE time
and expecting missile flyout momentarily. However, the launch never came. After
pausing just a few more seconds in case the missile were to launch late for some reason,
dive recovery was finally initiated. Once again, due to fixation of the pilot and ground
personnel, the overspeed was not noticed until post flight review was performed.
Analysis showed that the rapidly shrinking missile envelope or “launch acceptability
region” (LAR) experienced in a steep 60 degree dive constricted too far, so as to place
the computed target point outside the maximum acceptable launch range.
Figures 5 through 9 show the progression of events from the pilot’s heads up
display (HUD) perspective. The time from launch command at 591 KCAS to dive
recovery initiation was around two seconds, with overspeed of the 635 KCAS limit
occurring merely one second later. The maximum airspeed attained was 653 KCAS with
peak load factor of 4.1 being achieved well after top airspeed.
This event clearly demonstrated the criticality of a timely and aggressive dive
recovery. The automatically computed launch mode, although tactically representative,
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Figure 5
HUD AT ATTEMPTED WEAPONS RELEASE
Source: Author

Figure 6
HUD AT DIVE RECOVERY INITIATION
Source: Author
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Figure 7
HUD AT LIMIT AIRSPEED
Source: Author

Figure 8
HUD NEAR PEAK AIRSPEED
Source: Author
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Figure 9
HUD AT PEAK LOAD FACTOR
Source: Author
hindered the success of the test. Pilot distraction, whether warranted or not, directly
contributed to the late recovery attempt.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS SUMMARY
Several components control the probability of overspeed, but none operate
independently. Timeliness of recovery is indeed the most critical aspect, with indirect
factors determining how much acceleration the recovery must combat and how long it
may be delayed.
Perhaps the most unique overspeed instance was during aircraft number E-4’s
flight #455 where dive recovery was initiated at 610 KCAS yet still oversped. This is a
prime example of how all the aforementioned factors interact and must be all taken into
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account together. In that particular overspeed situation, recovery was not only attempted
“earliest” from the lowest airspeed, but also used the highest peak load factor of all
overspeed cases. However, load factor onset was only a paltry 1.31/s and power setting
was set near full MIL power. This proves that the techniques must work in concert, for
failure to respond to any single aspect of recovery airspeed, peak load factor, load factor
onset, or thrust reduction can still result in an airspeed limit exceedance.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
QUESTIONS FOR THE TEST PLANNER
Before any safe flight test can be planned, the test engineer and pilot must ask
three questions: 1) Do we really have to go to these conditions? 2) What different ways
can we get there? and 3) What are all the limits, their sources, and their hazards if
exceeded?
The first question appears obvious; test planners would never begin the process
unless appropriately tasked. However, requirements can often be unclear in a design
process. While a written specification may declare an ultimate requirement, there may be
different methods to achieve the goal other than pure flight test to those exact conditions.
Everyone may have their own idea on how to clear to that goal. For example, where flight
test engineers and test pilots might accept nothing less than actual weapon release at
actual parameters, weapons clearance personnel (the engineers who actually draft final
flight clearances) may accept lower airspeeds and Mach numbers and be satisfied with
extrapolation to desired conditions or merely comparison to existing models. Although
sometimes risky, this method is useful in areas of the envelope where little adverse
response is expected from the store. Nothing can be more damaging to a test project then
the customer asking “Why have you been trying to test to these conditions, failing, and
wasting my money? You never really had to test to that airspeed!” It has happened.
Next, all methods of achieving test conditions should be explored in “brainstorm” fashion. Just because certain techniques and profiles have been a staple for many
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years does not mean alternate methods do not have merit. In fact, it behooves the project
team to review every possible technique each time a new plan is developed. Although
“cut and paste” from one test to another is easier and faster for the test planner, the plan
must not revolve around the ease of planning but rather success of the test. Many
techniques that seem taboo by some may be intuitive to others and must be examined and
rationalized thoroughly. A perfect example is the requirement to perform a 60 degree
dive to attain a load factor of 0.5 for a missile separation test. In that case, many test
engineers believed the pushover-to-dive then pushover-to-release technique to be
completely forbidden, however, after several overspeeds from a 60 degree dive, further
investigation showed that those concerns were mostly predicated on free-fall weapons.
Lastly, thorough knowledge of the limits and an understanding of what drives
them are essential in making proper risk assessments. When confronted with a restriction
that could potentially be exceeded during a test flight, the test planner should review the
technique used to achieve conditions and the criticality of the limit. If both the probability
and severity of breaking a limit is high, then it should not be approached. On the other
hand, if the severity of breaking a limit is low, then risking occasional exceedances may
be warranted. Only through thorough investigation and discussion with the experts can
one accurately assess the hazards. Using seat-of-the-pants feelings or common sense is no
substitute for thorough research in this area

OPTIONS FOR THE TEST PLANNER
When confronted with a test-hampering restriction, the test team has only four
options: officially change the limit, alter the conditions, adjust the technique used to
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achieve conditions, or selectively accept the exceedance. The decision must be made only
after comprehensive review of all options and their risks.
The natural first response when faced with any obstacle is usually to try to remove
the obstacle. Of all the options to a test planner, this one should be considered the most
“right”, yet is usually the most difficult and frustrating to achieve. It can be performed
through careful research of the restriction and analysis of its consequences. Usually,
submission of a flight clearance change request is required since the test teams normally
do not “own” the clearances. This route, although optimum in that it may relieve an
artificial hurdle, usually takes a long time to pursue, so proper foresight and planning is
essential. Also, since it is the flight clearance personnel who must perform their own
analysis to determine the merit of their restriction, it will take their time and money to fix,
often neither of which is available. Since many restrictions are artificial and based on a
lack of data, not proof of jeopardy, most clearance experts are unlikely to budge on their
limit stance.
Changing the target test conditions is often the path of least resistance but requires
the most concessions from the test team. Unfortunately test teams are sometimes quick to
concede to programmatic pressures and sacrifice good engineering. While parameters
may sometimes be flexible and adjusted through negotiation with weapon flight clearance
authorities, they are often rigid and critical for collecting required data. Before altering
test conditions, therefore, one must first determine if suitable data can be collected
elsewhere in the envelope. If the answer is no, then the conditions should not be changed.
This, of course, must be weighed against gathering no data at all.
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If the conditions are critical and the hazard of exceeding a limit is high, then the
technique performed to achieve conditions must be altered to avoid the danger region in
question. Most previously established techniques are familiar to the test pilot, so although
this approach may seem easy from a planning standpoint, it may elevate the data risk by
presenting an unfamiliar technique to the test pilot. In any case, the test team must
investigate all options and solicit alternate ideas. Research of historical methods often
surprisingly reveals a plethora of suitable alternate techniques.
If conditions are essential, no other techniques exist, and the hazard of limit
exceedance is low, then the test team may elect to selectively ignore the limit. This
course of action does not suggest wonton disregard of regulations, but rather a disciplined
study of the risks and benefits of exceeding a discreet limit. Any test that is expected to
break a limit every time on every flight should instead be further reviewed for a better
technique. This approach specifically lends itself to projects that have implemented all
other reasonable mitigation processes yet still face an occasional exceedance of a lowhazard limit. Although often quite reasonable, this is a potentially risky method to
attempt. It is also extremely difficult to accomplish and requires the most research from
the test planner since it needs the concurrence of the project team’s chain of command
who is unlikely to oppose a limit imposed by the flight clearance authority. Nevertheless,
since flight test costs a lot of money and consumes many resources, it sometimes
behooves a test team to put forth the effort to build a case for its chain of command, so
that they may make an informed decision. The case for selectively accepting the
exceedance must also include the team’s plan to deal with the exceedance and how to
ensure that the aircraft is unimpaired afterwards, be it airborne chase aircraft inspection
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or ground inspection with engines running. Decisions “on the fly” and deviations from a
well thought out plan can be dangerous, so documented procedures approved by test
entity leadership are essential.
The test team will face a multitude of hurdles throughout all stages of the test.
There exist a multitude of limits, both real and artificial, that could hamper an otherwise
successful test. A thorough understanding of the risks and benefits of different methods to
avoid the limits is vital in choosing which course of action to take. In any case, if a limit
exceedance is so hazardous that it could result in damage to the test aircraft or loss of
critical data (which is why one is performing the test in the first place) then the test point
should naturally not be conducted.

THE NEW APPROACH
After painstaking review of the F/A-18 E/F weapons separation overspeed history
and specifically the obstacles faced during the AGM-88 HARM safe separation project,
several technique modifications can be established to mitigate the probability of
overspeed. In some cases, the approaches are not optimal but nevertheless still necessary
compromises to decrease the probability of exceedance. While many of these methods
are not new, they can be reinforced again. Despite being optimized for endpoint testing,
they can be applied to most any weapons separation work.

CHANGING THE LIMIT
In the case of the air-to-ground store airspeed limit on the F/A-18E/F, which is
approached using normal straight path dive delivery methods, the various options were
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explored. In most configurations, the most likely airspeed limit is imposed by aeroelastic
concerns. Since the aircraft was designed with a 15% airspeed margin above cleared
flutter limits, any excursion up to 650 KCAS, for example, would only consume 2½ % of
that margin, still leaving a full 12½ %, or almost 80 kts. This would provide plenty of
safety buffer for the test pilot, yet still allow him to proceed with his mission after an
accidental overspeed. However, attempts to obtain formal dispensation from the flight
clearance authority proved fruitless. Wording such as the following was incorporated, but
to no avail.
“Request authorization for inadvertent airspeed exceedance during aircraft dive
recovery. Exceedance will be no greater than 15 KCAS, less than 5 seconds in duration,
and above 10,000 ft. Aircraft which experience inadvertent exceedances within these
parameters may continue with flight test if the aircrew does not experience any airframe
vibrations, there are no degradations in flying characteristics, and the aircraft can be
visually inspected by chase or maintenance personnel.” 16
The author, having flown the AGM-88 HARM overspeed flight, maintains that
the risk of the aircraft explosively fluttering at 650 KCAS in any configuration is
extremely low, having flown there, and that a happy medium exists somewhere. The key
lies in bringing the clearance authorities together with the testers and negotiating a safe
and suitable solution.

ALTERING THE CONDITIONS
Data Point Reduction and Extrapolation
Although considered bad engineering by some, targeting a slightly lower airspeed
data point and extrapolating results out to desired conditions can be applied. This is
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usually reserved for stores that have shown no adverse trends and have demonstrated
improvements in response as airspeed and Mach number increase.
Airspeed Tolerance Band
As a smaller corollary to the data point reduction method, adjusting the target
airspeed, but maintaining the same tolerance band can be used. Ordinarily, endpoints
targeted 600 KCAS with a tolerance of ±10 kts. By adjusting the target to 590 KCAS and
shifting the tolerance to +20/-0 kts, the same allowable airspeed envelope is allowed, but
now the test pilot can get into the mindset of targeting a lower planned airspeed. This
provides an additional 10 kts buffer before limit exceedance, if properly executed. Since
releases may consistently occur 10 kts slower than actual desired conditions, however,
this technique should also only be reserved for tests where exact airspeeds are not critical.

ADJUSTING THE TECHNIQUE
Dive Recovery Method
Revealed as the number one contributor to successful overspeed avoidance, the
dive recovery must be expeditious and aggressive. Since timeliness is essential, test runs
will now be immediately aborted if attaining 610 KCAS or greater. The recovery will be
to at least a load factor of 4.0 and use a 2.0/s load factor onset rate. Throttles will be
immediately retarded to idle power and speedbrakes deployed.
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Minimum Available Load Factor
Since peak load factor was established as a contributing factor in whether an
aircraft oversped or not, it must be anticipated. Because it was established that dive
recoveries should target a load factor of 4.0, the aircraft should also have an available nz
of at least 5.0 to allow 1.0 of buffer before overstressing the airframe.
Pushover to Shallow Dive and Pushover to Desired Load Factor
Although these are three separate phases of the delivery profile, consisting of the
pushover-to-dive, shallow dive, and pushover-to-target load factor, they must normally
be performed together in succession to be effective. The low, manageable forward
acceleration supplied by the shallow dive usually drives the necessity for the other two
elements. Since this technique contains the push-to-load factor method, it is reserved for
forward firing, rail-launched ordnance only.
Dealing With Fan Speed Lockup
When attempting 1.20 IMN endpoints from 60 degree dives, it is quite possible to
accidentally attain 1.23 IMN and invoke the fan-speed lockup logic. With engine thrust
fixed at full MIL power, dive recovery can be hindered and overspeed facilitated. If
encountered during live runs, the run will be immediately aborted and dive recovery will
immediately be initiated. During practice runs, however, where the value of merely
pointing the aircraft’s nose in a 60 degree dive cannot be overstated, if 1.23 IMN is
achieved the run will continue and the test pilot may use throttle and speedbrake to
reestablish the proper profile and simply recover prior to reaching 610 KCAS.
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Pickle vs. Jettison
Since it was recognized that excessive LTE times can prevent a prompt dive
recovery, cases where depression of the weapon pickle switch do not result in immediate
ejection of ordnance, should be modified to use selective jettison modes, if available. If
releasing ordnance in sticks or strings (where jettison modes will not be helpful), total
stick length must be calculated and applied to the target release airspeed so that the
middle bomb will be released on desired conditions.

ACCEPTING THE EXCEEDANCE
Since the test community has a responsibility to “over-test” its aircraft for the
fleet operator, someone somewhere must assume the risk of doing so. The professional
weapons separation engineers must work in concert with their air vehicles counterparts to
meticulously examine and assess the hazards of overspeeding. This knowledge must be
presented to the leaders of the flight clearance process to change the limits, or at least
provide partial, if limited, capability beyond that of the fleet operator. If the experts in the
flight clearance process refuse to even consider a review of any sort, then the
responsibility falls upon the leaders of the test squadrons. These warehouses of expertise
have experienced engineers capable of performing their own analyses required to
appropriately assess these risks.
With limited aircraft assets, sortie costs over $55,000, and the consumption of
hundreds of man-hours, one failed test sortie can set a project back for months. In test
situations where there is no probability of damage or injury, yet which are bound by
artificial restrictions established by professional analysts, the test team’s chain of
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command owes it to both the warfighter and taxpayer to allow testing to continue when a
limit is breached, within a reasonable boundary, if no damage is done.

51

REFERENCES

52

LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Hegedus, J. Endpoint Overspeed during Weapon Separation Testing Brief, Naval Air
Weapons Center Aircraft Division, December 2002.
2. Detailed Specifications for Model F/A-18 E/F Aircraft Weapons Systems, Rev 17, SD565-3 Vol I, October 31, 1997
3. Flight Test Manual-109 Systems Testing, US Naval Test Pilot School, January 2000.
4. Standardized Armament Test Manual, NATCINST 8600.1A, September 1989
5. Preliminary F/A-18 E/F Tactical Manual Vol IV, NWP3-22.5-F/A18 E/F Vol IV A1F18EA-TAC020, October 2002
6. Structures Flight Test Handbook, Tactical Information Handbook, 2nd Edition,
AFFTC-TIH-98-02, Air Force Flight Test Center, Norton, Major William J. May 2002
7. Military Standard Airplane Strength and Rigidity, Flutter, Divergence, and Other
Aeroelastic Instabilities, MIL-A-8870
8. Moody, W. Flight Flutter Testing Brief, March 1996
9. Sisk, K. (September 2003). Interviewed at Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division,
Patuxent River, MD.
10. A Historical Overview of Flight Flutter Testing, NASA Technical Memorandum
4720, Kehoe, Michael W. October 1995
11. Bunton, R.W. A Brief Introduction to Flutter, December 1994
12. Raymer, Daniel. Aircraft Design: A Conceptual Approach, American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1999
13. Frawley, John. (September 2003). Interviewed at Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft
Division, Patuxent River, MD.
14. Miller, Theron J. (September 2003). Interviewed at Naval Air Warfare Center
Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, MD.
15. F/A-18 E/F NATOPS Flight Manual, NAVAIR A1-F18EA-NFM-000, dated 01
March 2001
16. Walczak, LCDR Peter J. Weapons System Integration Survival Guide, Naval Air
Weapons Center Aircraft Division, January 2003.
53

17. F/A-18 A-D NATOPS Flight Manual, NAVAIR A1-F18AC-NFM-000, dated 15
November 2002
18. Guide to Aircraft/Stores Compatibility, MIL-HDBK-244A, 06 April 1990.
19. Aircraft/Stores Compatibility: Systems Engineering Data Requirements and
Procedures, MIL-HDBK-1763, Department of Defense, 15 June 1998.
20. Halliday, J., Resnick, R., Fundamentals of Physics, John Wiley & Sons, 1988
21. F/A-18 A-D General Aircraft Information Manual, A1-F18AC-GAI-000
22. F/A-18 E/FGeneral Aircraft Information Manual, A1-F18EA-GAI-000
23. DeVito, A, Walczak, LCDR P. F/A-18 E/F MK-82/BSU-33 Safe Separation Test
Plan, Naval Air Weapons Center Aircraft Division, September 2002

54

APPENDICES

55

APPENDIX A
THE F/A-18 HORNET FAMILY
The F/A-18 A/B/C/D model Hornet (figure A-1), also known as the “Heritage”
Hornet, is the Navy and Marine Corps’ first tactical aircraft to provide capability for
supersonic carriage & release of conventional air-to-ground weapons. It is a twin-engine,
carrier-based strike-fighter, designed from the ground up as both a fighter and attack
aircraft. Boasting a mid-wing design, it has provisions to carry one fuselage centerline
and four wing mounted weapon pylons in addition to two fuselage and two wingtip airto-air missile launchers, for a total of nine weapon stations. Since air-to-ground weapons
may only be carried on the centerline or wing pylons, expanded carriage capability is
provided through the use of vertical ejector racks (VERs) and their canted siblings
(CVERs). Hung from aircraft pylons, these racks have the capacity to carry two air-toground free fall bombs each.17
The F/A-18 E and F model Super Hornet (figure A-2), although visually similar to
its predecessor, has 25 % larger wing, 34% larger leading edge extension (LEX), 36%
larger horizontal stabilizer and 15% larger vertical tail. Material changes include
incorporation of high-strength steels and advanced composites that, along with modern
manufacturing techniques, have resulted in a significant reduction in the total number of
airframe structural parts. The aircraft is powered by two General Electric F414
afterburning turbofan engines, each designed to provide approximately 22,000 lb of
thrust at MAX power (static thrust ratings based on sea-level standard atmosphere).
Internal fuel capacity of the F/A-18E model is approximately 14,600 lbs. The avionics
Appendix A
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suite maintains 90% commonality with the existing avionics in the F/A-18C/D models.
The Flight Control System (FCS) is an enhanced version of the existing F/A-18 fly-bywire system, designed to increase reliability and maintainability and is actuated by a 3000
and 5000 psi dual-pressure hydraulic system. It also sports the capability to carry two
additional under wing weapon pylons for a total of eleven weapon stations. When carried,
the Super Hornet wing pylons are rotated, or “toed”, outboard 4 degrees. Additionally,
the outboard-most pylons are canted 3.5 degrees outward. Also, the engine inlets are of a
faceted squared design, thus altering the airflow between the fuselage and inboard wing
stations.15
All F/A-18 versions have mid-empennage mounted horizontal stabilizers that
extend outboard to a point in line with the wing weapon pylons. This placement has
prevented the clearance of aft ejecting stores (such as flare dispensers) due to stabilizer
strikes. Additionally, the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet has suffered from horizontal stabilizer
airflow disturbance during release of some high drag free fall bombs, causing undesirable
pitch transients.
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Figure A-1
F/A-18 A/B/C/D HORNET BASIC AIRCRAFT
Source: General Aircraft Information Maintenance Manual
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Figure A-2
F/A-18 E/F SUPER HORNET BASIC AIRCRAFT
Source: General Aircraft Information Maintenance Manual
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE F/A-18 E/F SEPARATION MATRIX

Figure B-1
MK-82/BSU-33 SEPARATION TEST MATRIX
Source: F/A-18 E/F MK-82/BSU-33 Safe Separation Test Plan
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APPENDIX C FLIGHT TEST DATA
Table C-1
SUMMARY OF WEAPONS SEPARATION ENDPOINT ATTEMPTS
Peak
Airspeed
(KCAS)

Recovery
Initiation
Altitude
(1000 feet)

Recovery
Initiation
Airspeed
(KCAS)

Peak
Load
Factor
(g)

Load
Factor
onset rate
(g/sec)

Duration
Above 635
KCAS (sec)

653
653
646
643
643
642
642
642
640
638
637

15.6
16.5
15.4
16
15.7
16.2
15.8
16
16.4
18.2
15.1

637
619
626
632
621
626
626
626
622
610
629

3.7
4.1
5.3
4.0
3.2
4.1
3.7
3.2
4.3
5.9
5.5

1.45
1.13
2.13
2.42
1.11
1.31
2.20
1.22
1.76
1.31
3.10

4.30
4.08
2.17
2.41
1.99
1.70
3.45
2.73
1.41
2.11
0.80

635
635
634
633
633
633
632
630
630
629
629
629
629
627
626
625
625
624
624
624
622
622
622
622
622
621
620
620
619
619
618
618
617
616
616
612
612
610
609
608
606
606
605
601

15.8
16.6
16.4
13.9
17
16.1
15.1
17.4
18.2
16.9
15.6
18
16.4
15.7
17.4
14.8
17.7
16.9
16.3
18.4
15.8
17.5
16.8
18.5
16
17.8
17.8
17.8
16.4
17.7
17.1
18.5
16
17
17.8
17.9
16.9
16.3
17.5
18.7
17.3
16.4
16.4
17

621
619
619
631
612
608
617
618
600
619
618
616
614
622
603
618
608
617
609
597
617
615
613
604
602
606
610
598
609
607
608
602
600
610
604
604
601
609
601
596
591
590
590
584

4.7
3.4
4.3
5.0
3.8
3.7
4.5
5.0
4.4
3.5
5.9
7.1
3.9
4.6
5.0
5.4
4.8
4.0
4.2
3.8
4.8
4.4
3.8
3.6
3.9
5.5
3.9
4.2
3.7
3.2
5.6
4.6
3.3
3.3
4.3
3.9
3.8
3.5
5.6
4.9
3.1
4.9
6.4
4.4

2.32
1.30
1.46
2.28
0.82
0.84
1.52
2.66
1.17
1.65
1.75
3.87
1.52
2.66
1.34
2.71
1.80
1.88
1.17
0.99
1.96
2.37
1.63
1.00
1.14
1.87
2.22
1.20
1.64
1.44
1.94
1.37
0.98
0.89
1.90
0.94
1.57
1.79
2.93
1.58
0.75
1.66
1.99
1.35

Aircraft #, Flight #,
and Run Type
E10-203 Live
E10-197 Practice
E10-189 Live
E10-117 Live
E10-197 Live
E10-188 Live
E10-181 Live
E10-203 Practice
E10-125 Live
E4-455 Practice
E4-457 Live
E10-125 Practice
E10-181 Practice
E10-184 Live
E4-457 Practice
E10-214 Live
E10-213 Practice
E10-189 Practice
E10-129 Live
E10-197 Practice
E10-203 Practice
E10-232 Live
E4-455 Live
E10-188 Practice
E10-110 Live
E10-184 Practice
E4-529 Live
E4-500 Live
E10-186 Live
E10-213 Practice
E10-197 Practice
E10-128 Practice
E10-186 Practice
E10-184 Practice
E10-177 Live
E10-213 Practice
E4-501 Practice
E4-503 Live
E10-214 Practice
E10-108 Practice
E10-116 Practice
E10-232 Practice
E4-500 Practice
E10-177 Practice
E10-115 Practice
E4-493 Live
E4-503 Practice
E4-487 Live
E10-109 Practice
E4-501 Live
E4-492 Practice
E4-486 Practice
E4-528 Practice
E10-231 Practice
E4-528 Practice
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Peak Airspeed and Dive Recovery Airspeed Comparison
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Figure C-1
EFFECT OF DIVE RECOVERY AIRSPEED ON PEAK AIRSPEED
Source: Endpoint Overspeed during Weapon Separation Testing Brief

Appendix C
62

Peak Airspeed and Dive Recovery Load Factor Comparison
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Figure C-2
EFFECT OF PEAK LOAD FACTOR ON PEAK AIRSPEED
Source: Endpoint Overspeed during Weapon Separation Testing Brief
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G-Onset Rate and Peak Airspeed Comparison
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Figure C-3
EFFECT OF LOAD FACTOR ONSET RATE ON PEAK AIRSPEED
Source: Endpoint Overspeed during Weapon Separation Testing Brief
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Aircraft E-4, Flight 455 Weapons Separation
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Figure C-4
FLIGHT 455 THROTTLE POSITION COMPARISON
Source: Author
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Aircraft E-4, Flight 457 Weapons Separation
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Figure C-5
FLIGHT 457 THROTTLE POSITION COMPARISON
Source: Author
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Rollin and Pushover Performance Comparison
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Figure C-6
ROLLIN AND PUSHOVER ACCELERATION COMPARISON
Source: Author
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Rollin and Pushover Duration Comparison
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Figure C-7
ROLLIN AND PUSHOVER DURATION COMPARISON
Source: Author
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VITA

Born on June 10, 1971, Lieutenant Commander Peter J. Walczak grew up in
Durham, Connecticut where he graduated from Coginchaug Regional High School in
1989. Attending the State University of New York Maritime College in the Bronx, New
York, he graduated in 1993 with a Bachelor of Engineering in Electrical Engineering and
a United States Coast Guard Merchant Marine Third Assistant Engineer’s License.
Immediately following graduation, he was commissioned as an Ensign in the United
States Navy. He began flight training in 1994 and received his Naval Aviator “wings of
gold” flying tactical jet aircraft in 1996. After completing F/A-18 Hornet training in
Lemoore, California in 1997, he was assigned to the “Fighting Redcocks” of Strike
Fighter Squadron Twenty Two, flying the F/A-18C where he performed various
additional squadron support roles including maintenance department Quality Assurance
Officer. After an overseas deployment to the Arabian Sea and several combat missions
defending the Iraqi No Fly Zone in support of Operation Southern Watch, he was
selected for U.S. Naval Test Pilot School. As a test pilot in Air Test and Evaluation
Squadron Twenty Three in Patuxent River, Maryland, he is currently serving as
maintenance department Line Division Officer and F/A-18 E/F Weapon System
Integration Project Officer where he is involved with several integration projects, mostly
safe separation, for the Super Hornet. He has accumulated over 1400 flight hours in 20
different aircraft and will return to a fleet F/A-18 squadron in January 2004.
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